About 40 photographers gathered at Jeollado on East 4th Street, for the New York Press Photographers general membership meeting, which included members from The National Press Photographers Association, NYPD/DCPI and the NYPD Bomb Squad.
Vice-president Todd Maisel introduced Lt. Eugene Whyte of DCPI and Lt. Mark Torre, who gave a presentation on behalf of the Bomb Squad. By way of background, Torre indicated he had been on the job since just before the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. He addressed issues which can adversely affect the safety and security of both bomb squad personnel and photojournalists working on pre and post-blast situations.
Lt. Torre described the two basic blast situations (pre and post-blast) when the bomb squad would be summoned to a scene, the differences between each and the reasons for establishing a large safety perimeter. He said that every procedure is undertaken for reasons of safety of emergency personnel and bomb technicians - as well as the public - and requested that if journalists were asked to move away from the scene, to step back. He emphasized that they are not being prima donnas when they ask people to step back, but rather it is in their best interests and journalists as well from a safety standpoint, which is their first consideration.
Pre-blast:
He described a suspicious package as an example of a pre-blast situation. The bomb squad's assessment is crucial in determining a safe perimeter from which to work. If there is a suspicious package, "it's a bomb until we say it's not," Torre said. He indicated that there are strict ground rules with regard to filming and do not like their operations being filmed, even from a distance, for security reasons involving their methodology. Even with ride-alongs, they do not allow photographers/videographers to film their remote procedures or attempts to "dynamic render safe" working methods. They are adamant about stand-off distances being 1,000 feet or "behind hard cover," not only for safety reasons but for security reasons as well. The primary danger from explosive devices is fragmentation. The human body can withstand blasts to a certain degree, but fragments from the blast can be deadly.
Post-blast:
The second type of situation which Lt. Torre described is the post-blast situation in which an explosion has already occurred. The number one danger in a post-blast situation is the possibility of a secondary device having been left by a perpetrator in the vicinity in an unknown location (such as a car, garbage can) with the possibility of being triggered remotely. Bomb squad experts insist on a "push-back" of 1.5 times the longest distance of found evidentiary material - for safety reasons - as well as for preservation of an evidence-rich crime scene (the # 2 danger in a post-blast situation - destruction of the crime scene which might yield DNA material or evidence from something as small as a fingernail.)
Lt. Whyte and Lt. Torre fielded several questions about the use of flash, radios and cell phones, raised by photographers concerned with the ability to do their jobs. Lt. Torre said that some I.E.D.S. or improvised explosive devices are known to be triggered by radio devices and cell phones. Flash can trigger certain materials to spark or explode mainly in an enclosed environment. The bomb squad would prefer that neither cell phones, flash, pagers nor radios be used at any scene in which the bomb squad has been called. Torre said that these were "general approaches" and there are many technical variables which can affect an I.E.D.
A member brought up the idea of a dirty bomb. Torre's response was "stay-the-hell-away!" When asked how we would know if there was radiation involved, he said that sergeants can detect radiation via monitors on their shirts.